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ABSTRACT

Deportations are an understudied component of U.S. deportation policy. While a
range of literature focuses on the factors that influence immigration inflows and public
perceptions of immigrants, relatively few have studied deportations. I studied
deportations by conducting time-series analysis of yearly deportations and by analyzing
three original public opinion surveys on perceptions of deportations. In my time-series
chapter, I used regression analysis to find that the party composition of the U.S. House
and Senate, the unemployment rate, and the incarceration rate influence deportations. In
my public opinion chapter, I find that a plurality of American’s support deportations,
particularly when they believe an immigrant is undocumented and/or has committed a
crime. I also conducted content analysis on responses to an open-ended prompt, finding
that most respondents have a strong opinion on deportations, when tends to average as
fairly neutral. This analysis helps determine the language and factors policymakers
should emphasize when discussing deportations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The United States deports hundreds of thousands of migrants each year (DHS,
2019), and most of these immigrants have not been convicted of a criminal offense (DHS,
2013; DHS, 2014; DHS, 2015; DHS, 2016; DHS, 2017; DHS, 2018; DHS, 2019). The
United States is distinct from many other countries that are hubs of immigration because
of its heavy focus on punitive responses to undocumented immigration, including
deportations (Pew Research Center, 2019; Statista, 2019). U.S. deportations have been
heavily criticized for returning migrants to places of violence and inflicting human rights
abuses (Partelow & Wolgin, 2018; American Oversight, 2021; Human Rights Watch,
2020).
Most scholars focusing on the implications of deportations have found that they
are incredibly harmful for migrants’ home countries and have a little or negative impact
on the United States (Ambrosius, 2020; Ambrosius, 2021a; Ambrosius, 2018;
Ambrosius; 2021b; Warren & Kerwin, 2017). Past research has found that U.S.
deportations to Latin American countries increase violence in those countries are
migrants are forced to work in illicit industries, such as alongside drug cartels
(Ambrosius, 2020; Ambrosius, 2021a; Ambrosius, 2018; Ambrosius; 2021b). Rozo et al.
(2021) compared Mexican municipalities with their respective deportee return rate and
found areas with denser forced returnees experienced significantly more violent crime.
Warren and Kerwin (2017) studied the implications of deporting significant portions of
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the undocumented community, finding that many families would be pushed into poverty
and the national GDP would be reduced by trillions.
While past research has focused on the implications of deportations or the causes
and perceptions of immigration more broadly, relatively little research has studied the
factors that influence deportations and public opinion of deportations (e.g., King &
Obinna, 2018; King et al., 2012; Espenshade & Calhoune, 1993). King et al. (2012)
conducted the primary time-series analysis analyzing criminal deportations from the
United States. They found that the imprisonment and unemployment rate correspond with
additional deportations, yet they find relatively few other variables have a significant
relationship with deportations. Additionally, very few academic studies have analyzed
public opinion of deportations. Public opinion surveys have found that Americans are
fairly split on perceptions of deportations (e.g., Gallup, 2021) and past work theorizes
that documentation status, perceptions of crime, nationality, and several demographic
variables influence perceptions of deportations (e.g., Suro, 2009; Taylor-Clark, 2008;
Emamzadeh, 2018; Sohoni & Sohoni, 2016; Neblo 2004; Voice of America News 2005;
Wiegand 2009; Neblo et. al. 2012; Espenshade & Calhoune, 1993). Thus, this thesis
seeks to study the following two research questions:
(1) What factors influence deportations from the United States?
(2) How does the public perceive individuals who are deported from the United
States?
In order to address these research questions, I will first explain the relevant
literature, summarizing the history of U.S. deportations, and the factors that influence
yearly deportations, and public perceptions of deportations. I will, then, analyze the
2

factors that influence yearly deportations from the United States, particularly delving into
the relevant political, economic, and social factors. I find that additional Republican
members of Congress increase deportations and that the unemployment rate and
incarceration rate have complex relationships with the deportation rate. In my second
quantitative chapter, I will analyze the factors that influence public perceptions of
deportations, relying on three original surveys, and dividing my analysis into evaluations
of closed-ended and open-ended questions. I find that most Americans support
deportations, particularly when immigrants are undocumented and/or committed crimes. I
also find that most Americans have fairly neutral evaluations of deportations, which
likely become favorable when they feel immigrants are “undesirable.” Finally, I will
conclude this thesis by analyzing my findings and providing suggestions for future work.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Why and How do Deportations Happen?
In the simplest sense, undocumented immigrants are deported from the United
States because they are not legally residing in the United States. However, many
undocumented immigrants are deported for reasons ranging from criminal convictions,
improper documentation, or administrative errors (King & Obinna, 2018). Historically,
U.S. courts have argued that deportations are not a method of punishment, rather a
method of returning foreign individuals who have not followed U.S. law (Hester, 2010).
Yet, many scholars argue that deportations are a form of retribution and social control,
especially because they are often enforced inconsistently, which can lead to
discrimination and undermine due process (e.g., Hester, 2010; Golash-Boza &
Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013).
Today, removals are typically categorized into criminal and non-criminal
deportations, where deportees convicted of additional crimes are removed as ‘criminal
aliens,’ rather than as ‘illegal aliens’ (Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013). In rare
cases, migrants are put into a third category: “fugitive aliens,” which means “people who
were released from ICE custody and failed to report for their immigration hearings, and
people who have been ordered deported yet have not left” the United States (GolashBoza & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013, p. 281). Criminal deportations are often regarded as the
goal of law enforcement and can fall into level 1, 2, or 3, with level 1 including the most
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severe crimes, such as aggravated felonies or murder, and level 3 including the most
minor crimes, often misdemeanors with limited jail time (Leutert, 2015; Rosenblum &
McCabe, 2014; DHS, 2014). In 2019, criminal deportations were about 43% of all U.S.
deportations, which remained fairly consistent over the past decade (DHS, 2019).
Table 1 shows the ten most common criminal offenses for deportation, based on
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) data through 2020. The most common
criminal justifications for deportations were illegal entry (12.55%), driving under the
influence (8.23%), and assault (5.25%). Figure 1 shows criminal and non-criminal
deportations from 2004 to 2019 (DHS, 2013; DHS, 2014; DHS, 2015; DHS, 2016; DHS,
2017; DHS, 2018; DHS, 2019). Non-criminal removals are consistently a larger
percentage of overall deportations, particularly in the mid-2000s. The similarities in both
categories over time suggest an underlying factor motivating both types of deportations.
Table 1. 10 Most Common Criminal Charges1
Conviction
No Conviction
Criminal Conviction
Illegal Entry
Driving Under Influence
Assault
Traffic Offense
Cocaine Possession
Burglary
Illegal Re-Entry
Larceny
Marijuana Possession
Dangerous Drugs
Total

1

Number of Deportees
202,188
319,514
65,489
42,950
27,363
13,165
10,860
8,614
8,247
8,144
7,906
7,105
521,702

https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/remove/
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Percent
38.76%
61.24%
12.55%
8.23%
5.24%
2.52%
2.08%
1.65%
1.58%
1.56%
1.52%
1.36%

Figure 1. Criminal & Non-Criminal Deportations from 2004-2019 2

Migrants are deported through either judicial or non-judicial removals (Leutert,
2015), both of which are considered administrative rather than criminal procedures
(Jacome, 2015). Judicial removals are determined by the court system, while non-judicial
removals mean the migrant does not appear in front of an immigration judge (Leutert,
2015). Non-judicial removals include: (1) expedited removals: which is for those
captured within two weeks of arriving in the U.S. and less than 100 miles away from the
2

https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2019/table41

https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2018/table41
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2017/table41
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2016/table41
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015/table41
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2014/table41
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2013
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U.S. border, (2) reinstatement of final orders: which is for those caught additional times
after already being deported, and (3) administrative removals: which target those
convicted of aggravated felonies (Leutert, 2015). Additionally, there are voluntary
returns, which are not classified as deportations, where migrants agree to return to their
home country, and they face no legal consequences from the United States (Leutert,
2015). From 1892 to 2013, there were “47.7 million returns, with 7.7 million returns
between 2003 and 2013” (Leutert, 2015; DHS, 2014). Table 2 shows the distribution of
deportees, based on type of removal (Leutert, 2015; Rosenblum & McCabe, 2014; DHS,
2014). Most removals are non-judicial removals (65%), and the three types of nonjudicial removals are split fairly evenly (32-39%).
Table 2. Types of Removals (2003-2013)
Type
Judicial Removals
Non-Judicial Removals
Expedited Removal
Reinstatement of Final Orders
Administrative Removal
Total Removals

Number Removals
1,284,563
2,391,596
1,170,402
1,093,818
127,376
3,676,159

% Total Removals
35%
65%
32%
39%
3.5%

One common misconception regarding deportations is that the United States only
deports foreigners who are in the country illegally. Though it is rare, U.S. legal code
actually allows the deportation of “immigrants who have committed crimes of moral
turpitude or those classified as aggravated felonies” (The Offices of Stern Law, n.d., para.
8). Crimes of moral turpitude include, among others, fraud, theft, intent to harm,
domestic abuse, and driving while intoxicated (The Offices of Stern Law, n.d). Hundreds
of thousands of legal immigrants have been deported from the United States, often for
minor offenses like petty theft and drug possession (Kanstroom, 2014; Jacome; 2015).
7

However, legal immigrants facing deportation are typically afforded more rights than
undocumented migrants and are given the opportunity to challenge the decision in
immigration court and “obtain a waiver that grants legal forgiveness (para. 16)” (The
Offices of Stern Law, n.d).
History of Deportations in the U.S.
Forced removals have been tied to U.S. immigration law for several hundred
years and have been controversial since their first usage. In 1798, the Alien and Sedition
Acts expanded federal grounds for deporting male, non-citizens who were from enemy
states and non-citizens suspected of sedition (History.com Editors, 2009). A few years
later, The Chinese Exclusion Act allowed U.S. courts to deport Chinese immigrants and
required Chinese immigrants to register with the government, otherwise they could face
deportation (National Archives and Records Administration, 1989).
In the early 20th century, the United States engaged in expansive deportations,
many of which were highly criticized and considered human rights violations (Young,
2007). Ellis Island, often praised as an entry point for diverse groups, was actually used
to determine who was deported, which included those believed to become public charges,
such as women and children without a male relative, criminals, and those regarded as
“immoral” (Goldman, n.d.). Post-World War I, racial tensions, poor economic conditions,
and concerns about radicalism and foreigners culminated in widespread anti-immigrant
sentiment and led politicians to believe deporting immigrants could ensure American
safety (Dehler, 2013). Thus, in 1919 and 1920, the United States engaged in the Palmer
Red Raids, which detained and, in many cases, deported at least 10,000 foreigners
suspected of communist, anarchists, and anti-American affiliations (Dehler, 2013;
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Young, 2007). As economic growth plummeted during the Great Recession, White
Americans became increasingly concerned about Mexican immigrants taking their jobs
(Little, 2019). In response, local governments conducted raids, “which were informal and
lacked any due process” (para. 9), where they rounded up as many as 1.8 million
Mexicans, including countless American citizens, and deported them to Mexico (Little,
2019).
In 1952, the U.S. government passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
which expanded avenues for legal immigration, while allowing American citizens to be
charged with harboring undocumented immigrants (Herrling et al., 2013). While many
politicians advocated for additional progressive immigration legislation Attorney General
Brownell and other governmental figures, wanted to reduce undocumented Mexican
immigrant inflows and prevent Mexican laborers from illegally working in the United
States (Funderburk, 2016). Brownell initiated Operation Wetback, which was named
after an offensive term for undocumented Mexican immigrants and expelled up to 1.1
million undocumented Mexican workers from the country (though the actual number is
debated because some may have left voluntarily) (Funderburk, 2016). King and Obinna
(2018) analyzed deportation data from 1908-1986, disaggregating the data by reason for
deportation, and they found that mid-20th century deportations were often for
administrative reasons rather than concerning or violent behaviors, such as criminal
convictions.
In 1986, the United States passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act which
mandated that immigrants convicted of a deportation-worthy offense be immediately
returned to their home country (Blake, 2017). Prior to the law, many migrants were
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imprisoned domestically rather than deported (Blake, 2017). Soon after, the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act (ADA) of 1988 was passed, which allowed deportation for additional crimes
and reduced appeal hearings (Blake, 2017). The Immigration Act of 1990 further
expanded crimes requiring deportations, including drug-related charges and money
laundering (Blake, 2017). Similarly, the Immigration and Technical Corrections Act of
1994 “added additional weapons offenses, some theft and burglary offenses, prostitution,
tax evasion and several categories of fraud as aggravated felonies” (Blake, 2017, p. 6).
Finally, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 mandated deportation
for immigrants convicted of terrorism and expanded crimes that justified deportations
(Dole, 1996).
In the late 20th century, the United States passed one of the most impactful
deportations laws in U.S. history. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) provided additional grounds for deportations, increased
barriers for appeals, and accelerated the deportation process (Golash-Boza & HondagneuSotelo, 2013). The law retroactively allowed the deportation of all non-citizens sentenced
to at least a year in prison (Blake, 2017), which many experts argue dramatically
accelerated deportations (e.g., Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013; Blake, 2017).
Additionally, the law intensified border security, mandating increased personnel and the
creation of a fence along the Mexican border (Fragomen jr, 1997).
Post-9/11, the U.S. government funded and prioritized additional interior
enforcement, including identifying undocumented immigrants (Colemand & Kocker,
2011). Particularly, in 2003 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) were established and authorized to trace
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undocumented immigrants (Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013). The DHS
included the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which was charged with
protecting and enforcing U.S. border security (Chishti et al, 2017). Historically,
undocumented immigrants were deported mostly for national security reasons, but antiimmigrant sentiment and increased resources led to law enforcement deporting migrants
for minor traffic infractions or misdemeanor offenses (Coleman & Kocker, 2011). In
addition to enhanced border security, U.S. deportation laws were strengthened. For
example, the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act expanded governmental powers to remove
foreigners for national security purposes (Hagan et al, 2008). Then, in 2005, the Real ID
Act provided additional grounds to deport migrants for terrorist activity (Blake, 2017).
In the 2010s, the U.S. government continued prioritizing border security. In 2012,
the federal government allotted $18 billion to border security, which was 24% more than
what was given to other non-border control law enforcement agencies, including the FBI,
Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives, and The U.S. Marshals Service (Chishti et al, 2017). In 2012,
some potential deportees faced relief when the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) program provided some migrants who entered the United States as children
temporary legal status (Human Rights Watch, 2020). However, by 2014, the Obama
administration deported over 405,000 migrants, the most in recorded U.S. history (DHS,
2019).
As the United States prioritized national security, border enforcement was heavily
criticized by human rights groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), for using inhumane techniques and breaking families apart (ACLU, n.d.). ICE
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has relied on strategies including tear gas when apprehending migrants (Partelow &
Wolgin, 2018), and detained them in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions prior to
deportation (American Oversight, 2021). The Human Rights Watch also critiqued U.S.
deportation policy for returning migrants who would likely face violence and danger in
their home country (Human Rights Watch, 2020).
Beginning in 2020, U.S. deportation policy was heavily scrutinized because the
United States continued deporting migrants amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, which some
medical experts identified as a disease risk (Cenat, 2020). Though, in 2021, the
immigration and border security officials were directed that “immigration officers [could]
no longer detain and deport people from the U.S. solely because they are undocumented”
(Constantino, 2021, para. 1). Similarly, officials were also told to focus on deporting
migrants who threaten public safety and national security (Constantino, 2021).
Deportations under the Biden administration fell significantly to record low rates (The
Economist, 2021).
Modern Deportation Characteristics
Modern deportations have several overarching trends. Starting with gender, the
overwhelming majority of deportees are men. In 2008, 95% of deportees from El
Salvador were men (Hagan et al, 2011), which is consistent with gender distributions
across all United States removals (Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013).
Interestingly, the majority of immigrants to the United States are female (American
Immigration Council, 2020), suggesting either undocumented immigrants or those who
face deportations must be mostly male. Next, age: over 90% of deportees were 20-29
(44%), 30-39 (33%), or 40-49 (14%) (TRAC Immigration, 2014), suggesting most
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deportees are in their 20s or 30s. Finally, regarding geography almost 60% of all U.S.
deportees are from Mexico (DHS, 2019). Table 3 shows U.S. deportation per region in
2019. Nearly 94% of deportations from the U.S. were of people from North America,
while just over 3% were from South America.

Table 3. U.S. Deportations per Region of Nationality, 2019 3
Region of Nationality
Africa
Asia
Europe
North America
Oceania
South America
Unknown
Total

Total Deportees
2,601
6,296
2,494
336,824
288
11,338
44
359,885

Percent
0.72%
1.75%
0.69%
93.59%
0.08%
3.15%
0.01%

Figure 2 displays the nationalities of deportees in 2019, divided by country. The
United States deports the most people to Mexico, Canada, India, and China, likely due to
the large population and/or geographic proximity of those countries. The map highlights
Central America, given the association between the region and undocumented
immigration.

3

https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2019/table41
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Figure 2. Nationalities of Deportees, 2019

Causes of Deportations
Limited past research has focused on the various factors corresponding with, and
potentially causing, deportations. King et al. (2012) conducted the primary time-series
analysis of criminal deportations from the United States, finding that several factors such
the unemployment rate and imprisonment rate correspond with deportations. However,
their analysis and other authors have highlighted that several other potential factors
influence deportations and immigration more generally, which are described below.
Political Context
Major U.S. political parties are often perceived as hyper-polarized on immigration
issues, with Democrats viewed as advocates of liberal immigration policies and
14

Republicans viewed as pro-restrictive immigration policies. While the Republican Party
is typically associated with limited government, suggesting support for few governmental
restrictions on immigration, concerns over immigrants needing welfare and imposing
public spending or tax burdens tend to reduce conservative support for immigration
(Milner & Tingley, 2011). Additionally, many conservatives tend to oppose immigration
because of apprehension that foreigners will take American jobs (Blake, 2014) and pose a
threat to public safety (Hamer, 2019). Conversely, members of the Democratic Party
often advocate for more open immigration policy because of a belief that people have the
freedom to immigrate to the country and improve the United States (Casellas & Leal,
2013; Ivaldi, 2012; Facchini, 2011; Gimpel & Edwards, 1999; Fetzer, 2006). The
Democratic Party also has a larger percentage of immigrant (Budiman et al, 2020) and
urban voters (Savat, 2020) who are more likely to engage frequently with immigrants,
corresponding with increased support for immigrants (Tu and Lee 2014; Pettigrew and
Tropp 2008; King et al 2009).
Casellas and Leal (2013) analyzed substantive U.S. immigration legislation in
Congress and found that Democrats where overwhelmingly more likely to support proimmigrant policies, which is consistent with several other researcher’s findings (e.g.,
Ivaldi, 2012; Facchini, 2011, Gimpel & Edwards, 1999; Fetzer, 2006). Other empirical
studies found no statistically significant relationship between political party and
immigration reform (e.g., Natter et al, 2020). Yet, the political divergence in deportation
policy preferences is unclear based on the current literature. King et al. (2012) found that
political party had no impact on deportation rates and Nowratsteh (2019) found that, on
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average, more immigrants were deported during Democratic presidents’ terms, compared
to Republican administrations.
Table 4 shows the number of deportations, per president from 1892 to 2019. The
most took place under the Obama administration, with the Trump administration in
second place. There appears to be an incremental increase, then sharp declines under the
Harding and Kennedy administrations. Figure 3 shows the average yearly deportations
per political party, since 1892 and 1988. Democrats are responsible for more
deportations, on average, in both figures. Interestingly, these trends diverge from general
immigration reform, where Democrats tend to support more pro-Immigrant policies (e.g.,
Casellas & Leal, 2013; Ivaldi, 2012; Facchini & Steinhardt, 2011; Milner & Tingley,
2011). Of course, this data does not account for the political party representation in
Congress or state governments that aid in deportations, nor does it address the factors that
influence demand for undocumented immigration.
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Table 4. Deportations per President4
President

Deportations
2,801
9,069
17,642
76,390
83,150
162,371
60,652
164,913
110,275
171,939

Deportation per
Year
2,801
2,267
3,528
10,913
20,788
20,296
20,217
32,983
27,569
13,226

Political
Affiliation
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat

Years in
Office
1
4
5
7
4
8
3
5
4
13

Benjamin Harrison
Grover Cleveland
William McKinley
Theodore Roosevelt
William H. Taft
Woodrow Wilson
Warren G. Harding
Calvin Coolidge
Herbert Hoover
Franklin D.
Roosevelt
Harry S. Truman
Dwight D.
Eisenhower
John F. Kennedy
Lyndon B. Johnson
Richard M. Nixon
Gerald R. Ford
Jimmy Carter
Ronald Reagan
George Bush
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Donald J. Trump

140,553
110,019

20,079
13,752

Democrat
Republican

7
8

23,969
48,737
81,022
82,316
105,378
168,364
141,326
869,646
2,012,539
3,066,457
911,334

7,990
9,747
16,204
27,439
26,345
21,046
35,332
108,706
251,567
383,307
303,778

Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican

3
5
5
3
4
8
4
8
8
8
3

4

https://www.cato.org/blog/deportation-rates-historical-perspective
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2019/table41
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Figure 3. Average Yearly Deportations, per Party5

Economic Conditions
Historically, changes in immigration policy have often corresponded with
economic conditions (Dehler, 2013; Little, 2019). However, the impact of economic
policy on immigration, and deportation policy, is unclear. One theory is that when the
unemployment rate is high, the government is more likely to pass restrictive immigration
policy because of concern that foreigners will take Americans’ jobs (Facchini &
Steinhardt, 2011). Conversely, several economic studies have found that immigration
improves economic outcomes by expanding labor markets and contributing to innovation,
suggesting policymakers have an incentive to support liberal immigration policy (e.g.,

5

https://www.cato.org/blog/deportation-rates-historical-perspective
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2019/table41
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Constant, 2021; Huang, 2020; Duleep & Regets, 2014). However, the labor market
theory of immigration policy suggests “those who gain from it [immigration]
economically will support it and those who lose will oppose” immigration (Milner &
Tingley, 2011, p. 7), which could suggest mixed policy outcomes. For example, Facchini
& Steinhardt (2011) found that representatives living in wealthier districts were less
likely to support additional immigration, likely because they were already wealthy, so
they did not want to change status quo outcomes.
Empirical work has been mixed. Milner & Tingley (2011) found that higher
unemployment rates correlate with more Congressional votes favoring border security.
Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) found that higher unemployment rates corresponded with
support for more liberal immigration policies, but these findings were attributed to
omitted variable bias. Yet, several researchers found no relationship between politician
support for immigration policy and economic conditions (e.g., Gonzalez & Kamdar,
2000; Facchini et al, 2011).
Theories for general immigration policy might poorly apply to analyses on
deportation because many immigration policies focus on certain “desirable” types of
immigration. Many politicians support immigration policies increasing high-skilled
immigrants who are traditionally viewed as beneficial for the economy, while
undocumented immigrants are perceived as more likely to lower overall wages (e.g.,
Milner & Tingley, 2011; Fasani et al, 2020), suggesting negative economic outcomes are
more likely to correspond with increased deportations (King et al, 2012). Historical
increases in deportations have often been attributed to worsening economic conditions,
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such as the Great Depression (Dehler, 2013; Little, 2019), which is supported by the
empirical findings of King et al. (2012).
Crime Concerns
Another potential influence on the deportation rate is U.S. crime rate statistics.
Most immigrants who are removed have technically committed a crime, even if it is
minor or merely illegal entry (Syracuse University, n.d.). Thus, King et al. (2012)
theorizes and find supporting evidence for increased incarceration rates and higher
homicide rates corresponding with more criminal deportations. One potential explanation
for this is when crime rates are high politicians and the general public feel a stronger need
for the government to respond to crime, which could manifest in additional deportations
(e.g., O’Brien, 1996). Another explanation is when the United States is incarcerating
more people, extra resources are devoted to stopping crime, expanding focus on
deporting undocumented and/or criminally convicted immigrants. There is some research
suggesting that undocumented immigrant communities underreport crime because they
fear deportation from law enforcement (e.g., Sampson, 2008), but this likely would not
greatly skew national crime statistics.
Public Opinion on Deportations
While public opinion surveys often assess the public’s views on immigration, the
related issue of deportations is rarely focused on in public opinion surveys. A 2019
Gallup survey asked Americans in 2019 whether all undocumented immigrants should be
deported from the United States, and respondents were split with approximately 40%
supporting the policy and 60% against the policy (Gallup, 2021). Cosby et al. (2013)
analyzed the 2009 SCSHI national public opinion survey and 2006 Pew Hispanic Center
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survey, and asked respondents whether undocumented immigrants should be deported,
allowed to stay temporarily on worker’s permit, or allowed to stay permanently via legal
permanent residence status (LPR). Figure 4 shows the descriptive results of both surveys.
Respondents appeared substantially more likely to support deportations in 2009
compared to 2006 (51% vs 27%), while they were much more likely to advocate for
allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in 2006 (11% vs 32%). In 2015, a majority of
Americans said that they believed undocumented immigrants should be provided a path
to citizenship (Gallup, 2021) and most Americans supported allowing immigrants
brought to the country illegally as children to stay in the United States (National
Immigration Forum, 2020).

Figure 4. U.S. Policy Response to Undocumented Immigration
While descriptive statistics can help understand aggregate results, delving into the
factors that correspond with support for deportation helps further understand the public’s
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opinions. Several factors are theorized to help explain public support for deportation,
which are described below.
Documentation Status
One potential factor that influences whether the public support deportation is
immigrant’s documentation status. Americans tend to be overwhelmingly more
supportive of legal immigration, compared to undocumented immigration (e.g., Suro,
2009; Taylor-Clark, 2008). One explanation is that Americans are more likely to view
undocumented immigrants as lazy and taking the “easy” way into the United States
(Emamzadeh, 2019; Flores & Schachter; 2018). Emamzadeh (2018) analyzed
psychological studies on perceptions of undocumented immigrants which argued that
many Americans relied on stereotypes of undocumented immigrants, such as that they
were freeloading, or disease ridden, causing negative perceptions of those who are
undocumented. Alternatively, the theory of in-group identification could explain
American distaste for undocumented immigrants (Emamzadeh, 2018). The theory argues
that some Americans view their identity as superior to the rest of the world, to the point
of group narcissism, leading some to reject those they believe have a different culture and
lack an understanding of English (Emamzadeh, 2018). Finally, another explanation is that
Americans could have an absolutist view on the law and could believe that crossing the
border illegally should always lead to deportation. Thus, even though deported
immigrants are sometimes permanent residents, Americans could be more supportive of
deporting undocumented immigrants.
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Crime
Historically, there has been a public association between immigration and crime,
which could manifest into public distrust of undocumented immigrants. For example, in a
Gallup survey that asked the same question for approximately ten years, 33-40% of
Americans worried a great deal about immigration and up to 50% reported being
concerned about high numbers of undocumented immigrants (Gallup, 2021). Though this
question does not explicitly identify crime as the cause of concern, many respondents
could have been thinking about crime when answering the question. However, when
asked about crime specifically, nearly 75% of Americans believed that immigrants were
at least somewhat more likely to increase overall crime rates (Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007
citing the National Opinion Research Center’s 2000 General Social Survey).
Though immigrants are not associated with increased crime rates (e.g., Rumbaut
& Ewing, 2007), Sohoni and Sohoni (2016) studied public discourse on immigrants and
found that the media is likely to sensationalize immigrants committing crimes. They
found many erroneous news articles in which undocumented immigrants were considered
criminals who lacked morals or came from cultures where crime was acceptable (Sohoni
& Sohoni, 2016). Additionally, perceptions of immigrants as criminals could be
perpetuated by stereotypes and television, such as depictions of the Italian mafia,
Colombian drug cartels, and other groups (Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007). Past studies have
found that concerns over immigrant crime corresponds with reduced support for
immigration (e.g., McLaren & Johnson, 2007). If Americans are presupposed to believe
that undocumented immigrants are more likely to commit crimes, then they are also
probably more likely to favor harsh responses to immigrant crime, such as deportations.
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Nationality
Another potential factor that could influence American’s perception of
undocumented immigrants and deportations is the nationality of immigrant groups. Past
research has found that Americans are more likely to view undocumented Asian,
European, and Arab immigrants favorably, compared to undocumented Mexican
immigrants and undocumented immigrants in general, suggesting that Americans conflate
illegal immigration with Mexican immigrants (Ramakrishnan et al, 2015). One
explanation is that Americans are more likely to view Latino immigrants negatively,
likely because of the politicized media coverage focusing on Central America (Neblo
2004; Voice of America News 2005; Wiegand 2009; Neblo et. al. 2012). Conversely,
Americans could be more distrustful of immigrants from non-Western or poor countries.
Nadzaku (2018) argues that many Americans are experience metathesiophobia, meaning
the fear of change, and are concerned that increased immigrants, particularly from very
different areas and cultures, will change the American way of life.
However, past survey data found relatively little variation between respondents’
perception of immigrants identified by their nationality. Survey data found that “a solid
majority of Americans believe it is a good thing that people from Asia, Mexico and Latin
America come to live and work in the United States” (Taylor-Clark, 2008). Nearly 60%
of Americans support Asian and Latin American immigrants in a Pew Global Attitudes
Project survey (Taylor-Clark, 2008 citing Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005).
Americans with a negative attitude towards undocumented immigrants of a specific
nationality could favor deportations, compared to a more lenient response.
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Demographics
We can expect certain demographic factors to influence perceptions of
deportations. First, past research has found that older Americans are more likely to
perceive undocumented immigrants negatively, often because of anticipated negative
consequences (Espenshade & Calhoune, 1993). Second, while white American have
empirically advocated for harsh responses to undocumented immigration (e.g., Cohen,
2021), Latinos are theorized to view immigrants more positively since they are likely to
have more cultural connections (Espenshade & Calhoune, 1993). Third, Americans who
are less educated have been found to support undocumented immigrants less
(Emamzadeh, 2018), with possible explanations ranging from educated individuals
having more experience and knowledge of immigration to education facilitating the
development of more nuanced thinking (Espenshade & Calhoune, 1993). Fourth, lowincome individuals might be more supportive of deportations because they are wary
undocumented immigrants, often their competition in the labor market, could take their
jobs (e.g., Emamzadeh, 2018). Finally, many polls found that conservatives are more
likely to favor deportations than liberals (e.g., Cosby et al, 2013) because of ideological
differences about the role of immigration. For example, a 2020 survey found that
Republican respondents were more concerned about illegal immigration than COVID-19
(National Immigration Forum, 2020).
Research Questions
Based on my review of the literature, I ask the following research questions:
(1) What factors influence deportations from the United States?
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(2) How does the public perceive individuals who are deported from the United
States?
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CHAPTER 3: TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF DEPORTATIONS

In this chapter, I seek to answer the question: What factors influence deportations
from the United States, by analyzing which variables influence yearly changes in
deportations in the U.S. Thus, this chapter will first summarize the relevant literature,
then analyze the relevant data and variables, then conduct the empirical analysis, and
conclude by analyzing my findings.
Literature Summary
In the first part of this chapter, I will summarize the relevant literature addressing
the causes of deportations. Limited past research has analyzed the factors influencing
deportations (e.g., King et al. 2012). However, relevant research has determined that the
primary variables of interest are those related to political context, economic conditions,
and perceptions of crime. First, past research has argued that the period’s political context
shapes the leniency regarding deportations. Historically, Congressional Democrats are
overwhelmingly more likely to support substantive pro-immigration policies (e.g.,
Casellas & Leal, 2013; Ivaldi, 2012; Facchini, 2011, Gimpel & Edwards, 1999; Fetzer,
2006), yet Democratic presidents, on average, have deported significantly more
immigrants (Nowratsteh, 2019). Second, economic conditions are theorized to influence
the deportation rate. For example, Milner & Tingley (2011) found that higher
unemployment rates corresponded with harsher border security, suggesting a desire to
remove or prevent undocumented immigration to the United States. Finally, crime
indicators are believed to correspond with deportations. King et al. (2012) found that
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higher incarceration rates and homicide rates correlate with additional deportations,
suggesting that crime could incentive crackdowns on immigrant communities.
Data and Variables
In the second part of this chapter, I will analyze my data and conduct the relevant
empirical analysis.
Dependent Variable
I use data from the Department of Homeland Security, which has U.S. deportation
data from 1892 to 2019. The data ranges from numbers low in the thousands to midhundreds of thousands, leading me to log the data, shown in Figure 5, so the plot is not
exponential. Logging the data helps stabilize the series’ variance and prevent undue
influence from outliers. The plot shows many shifts in the number of yearly deportations,
with a general upward increase over approximately the past thirty years.

Figure 5. Logged Deportations per Year (1892 to 2019)
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To determine if my data has a trend, I conduct a Dickey-Fuller test with a null of a
unit root. My data does not appear to have a trend, so I tested the data without a trend
variable and calculated a Dickey-Fuller statistic of -0.83, so I failed to reject the null of a
unit root. I tested the data with a trend variable just in case, and calculated a DickeyFuller statistic of -1.73, so once again I failed to reject the null of a unit root. Thus, I do
not use a trend variable and I must remove the stochastic trend in the data, which I do by
taking first differences and looking at the rate of change in deportations. Figure 6 below
shows the results, suggesting significant change in the rate of deportations over time.

Figure 6. Rate of Change Deportations Per Year (1892 to 2019)

Independent Variables
Next, to assess the variables that influence deportations, I incorporate a range of
independent variables, each representing the entire period of data (1892-2019). Summary
statistics are included in appendix A. First, I include several political variables because
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the political make-up of the federal government could influence deportations. I included a
variable indicating the change in the ratio of Republicans to Democrats in the House 6, a
variable indicating the same in the Senate 7, and a dummy variable for a Republican
president8. Next, I included a measurement of economic conditions. Specifically, I
included the unemployment rate (Ramy & Zubairy, 2018) because the unemployment
rate is theorized to impact perceptions of immigration. Next, I included a variable
proxying the overall crime rate. Accurate crime rate and homicide data are difficult to
find from the time period of my analysis, so I used the logged change in the yearly
incarceration rate9, which has been used in past deportation analyses (King et al., 2012).
Empirical Analysis
To evaluate U.S. deportations, I included two types of regression models: OLS
regression and Vector Autoregression. First, I ran the OLS regression model with robust
standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and the results are presented in Table 5
below.

https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm
8
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/oct/15/us-presidents-listed
9
https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/cpus19st.pdf,
https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKE
wiwzDhjKP0AhXPCZ0JHXx1DxwQFnoECAYQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fbjs.ojp.gov%2
Fcontent%2Fpub%2Fpdf%2Fhcsus5084.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0gYrsEeMWjCYtnRmXtBG
VF.
6
7
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Table 5. OLS Regression on U.S. Deportations

Δ ln (House Party Ratio)
Δ ln (Senate Party Ratio)

(1)
Model
0.001***
(0.00)
0.001***
(0.00)

Republican President

-0.641
(.527)

Δ ln (Unemployment Rate)

0.015**
(0.006)

Δ ln (Incarceration Rate)

0.896
(0.763)

Constant

-0.363
(0.386)

Observations
126
R-squared
0.088
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

The OLS model finds that several of the political indicators (the ratio of
Republicans to Democrats in the House and Senate) correspond with the yearly change in
U.S. deportations. The regression suggests that increases in the number of Republican
legislators in the House and the Senate correlate with additional deportations. While the
coefficients appear relatively small (0.001), a 1% change in Congressional party ratio is a
fairly small shift in the number of legislators (1 in the Senate and 4-5 in the House).
However, the dummy variable for the Republican president was insignificant, suggesting
that Congress passes more impactful deportation policies or that deportation policies are
not dependent on the President’s political party. Next, the logged change in the
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unemployment rate corresponds with additional deportations and is significant at the 0.05
level, suggesting higher unemployment rates incentive harsher deportation policies.
Finally, the model finds a null relationship between the incarceration rates and
deportations.
Next, I run a Vector Autoregressive model, which allowed me to better evaluate
the variable’s dynamic relationships with each other. I chose to run a VAR model
because it evaluates how each variable influences other variables, rather than just onedirectional analysis, and allows me to test several lagged variables. I included the
deportations rate, unemployment rate, and incarceration as the variables tested. I ran
Final Predictor Error, Akaike Information Criterion, Hannan Quinn Information Criteria,
and Schwartz Information Criteria tests to determine two lags were optimal for each
variable. Table 6 below shows the regression results and Figure 7 shows the impulse
response functions. The unemployment rate immediately corresponds with additional
deportations, but after a few years appears to correspond with less deportations. While
the incarceration rate yields null results in the OLS regression, the VAR model suggests
that incarceration corresponds with additional deportations after 2 years, then less
deportations after 4 years.
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Table 6. Partial VAR Results
(1)
Model
Δ ln (Unemployment Rate)
Lag 1
Lag 2

0.01*
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)

Δ ln (Incarceration Rate)
Lag 1
Lag 2

.
-0.31
(1.18)
2.00*
(1.10)

Observations
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

126

Figure 7. Impulse Response Functions Unemployment
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Figure 8. Impulse Response Functions Incarceration

Robustness Checks
I ran several robustness checks, which did not alter the model’s core findings. I
tested several interaction terms between several variables, including each of the political
variables, indexed for the U.S. population, tested the homicide rate, tested the yearly
number of immigrants, tested the number yearly New York Times featured articles
discussing immigration, tested the number of immigration-related bills in Congress and
the number of bills that passed, and I tested dummy variables for the most significant
deportation policies. I also tested the data divided into four time periods, to evaluate how
the independent variables influence changed per period, yet the low sample size likely
skewed the results.
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Findings
Past time-series analysis focusing on deportations has primarily conducted OLS
analysis (King et al., 2012). This chapter replicates and extends this prior analysis and
presents several findings: First, I evaluated the political context’s influence on
deportation rates. OLS regression results found that increases in Republican
policymakers in Congress corresponds with harsher deportation policy, which is
consistent with past research (e.g., Ivaldi, 2012; Facchini, 2011, Gimpel & Edwards,
1999; Fetzer, 2006) and diverges from the null findings in King et al. (2012). However,
the dummy variable for Republican presidents is insignificant, consistent with
Nowratsteh’s (2019) findings that there is little Presidential party relationship with
deportation policy. Either Congress has more impact in deportation policies than the
president, or past presidents tended to implement similar deportation policies.
Second, I analyzed the unemployment rate’s impact on deportations and found a
complex relationship. While the OLS regression and first lag in the Vector
Autoregression suggest that increases in the unemployment rate increase deportations, the
second VAR lag finds that a higher unemployment rate corresponds with reduced
deportations. One explanation for this is that the immediate response to increased
unemployment rates incentivizes anti-immigrant and pro-deportation policies (i.e.,
Facchini & Steinhardt, 2011; Milner & Tingley, 2011; King et al, 2012), but eventually
policymakers moderate their stance and encourage immigrant to expand labor markers
and improve the economy (e.g., Constant, 2021; Huang, 2020; Duleep & Regets, 2014).
Finally, I evaluated the incarceration rate’s impact on deportations. While the
OLS regression results are null, the second VAR lag suggests higher incarceration rates
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correspond with additional deportations, while a few years later lower deportation rates.
The theoretical justification for this is unclear, but potential explanations are that
increased crime rates incentivize more restrictive incarceration and deportations policies
(e.g., O’Brien, 1996) and encourage additional resources focused on finding
undocumented immigrants, but that such an approach because fiscally and
administratively unsustainable after several years. The results from the VAR model
provide additional insight beyond OLS regression, and suggests models look at more
dynamic variable interacts are ideal for analyzing deportations.
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CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC OPINION OF DEPORTATIONS FROM THE UNITED
STATES
This chapter attempts to answer the question: How does the general public feel
about deportations from the United States? Thus, this chapter will first summarize the
relevant literature, then analyze original public opinion survey results, and conclude with
the chapter’s findings.
Literature Summary
Past public opinion research focusing on perceptions of deportations is limited.
Survey results have found that Americans are split on whether deportation is an
appropriate respond to undocumented immigration (Gallup, 2021; Cosby et al., 2013).
Past research has theorized several factors, including documentation status, perceptions
of crime, immigrant’s nationality, and several demographic variables influence
perceptions of deportations. First, immigrants’ documentation status is believed to
influence public support for deportations. Americans tend to be overwhelmingly more
supportive of legal immigration, compared to undocumented immigration (e.g., Suro,
2009; Taylor-Clark, 2008), who are viewed as freeloading or disease ridden
(Emamzadeh, 2018), suggesting that Americans may be more supportive of deportations
for undocumented immigrants. Second, public discourse often links immigrants, without
supporting evidence, to crime acts and sensationalizes immigrant crime stories (Sohoni &
Sohoni, 2016). Concerns over immigrant crime correspond with harsher responses to
immigration, such as support for deportations (e.g., McLaren & Johnson, 2007). Third,
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past research has found that Americans may view certain immigrant groups, such as
Central American or non-Western immigrants (Neblo 2004; Voice of America News
2005; Wiegand 2009; Neblo et. al. 2012) more negatively, suggesting additional support
for deporting those specific immigrations. Finally, several demographic factors, including
age (e.g., Espenshade & Calhoune, 1993), race and ethnicity (e.g., Cohen, 2021;
Espenshade & Calhoune, 1993), education (e.g., Emamzadeh, 2018), income (e.g.,
Emamzadeh, 2018), and ideology (e.g., Cosby et al, 2013) are believed to impact
perceptions of deportations.
Survey Analysis
To answer my research question, I analyze three original surveys, two conducted
in the United States and one in Mexico, all focusing on public perceptions of deportations
from the U.S. I implemented each via Qualtrics web survey and used quota sampling
based on age, gender, and region. The first U.S. survey and the Mexico survey were
conducted from June 24-26th, 2021, each with 625 respondents and the second U.S.
survey was conducted from November 10-12th, 2021, with 1,007 respondents. Summary
statistics are available for the surveys in Appendix B, Appendix C, and Appendix D 10.
The empirical results are divided into two sections, the first section focuses on the
results from close-ended questions in the June U.S. survey, November U.S. survey, then a
comparison between all three surveys, and the second section analyzes content analysis
from two-open ended questions on the U.S. surveys.

10

Each survey was fairly representative of the population; however, Hispanic individuals were slightly
under-sampled in the second U.S. survey (15% vs 18%).
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Closed-Ended Survey Analysis
June U.S. Survey
In the June U.S. survey, I asked an experimental question attempting to determine
the level of animosity directed at undocumented immigrants and immigrants committing
crimes. Additionally, the question allowed me to determine if respondents believed that
deportation is more acceptable in certain contexts, such as when an immigrant is
undocumented or has committed a crime. One thing to note is that in this survey I
focused specifically on deportations to Mexico because most deportations from the U.S.
are to Mexico (DHS, 2016), which helps eliminate other factors potentially influencing
views. I asked the question below, with a version randomly assigned to each respondent,
which they were asked to evaluate on a five-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to
strongly agree:
Version 1: The U.S. should deport undocumented Mexican immigrants back to
Mexico.
Version 2: The U.S. should deport undocumented Mexican immigrants who have
committed crimes in the U.S. back to Mexico.
Version 3: The U.S. should deport undocumented Mexican immigrants who have
committed violent crimes in the U.S. back to Mexico.
Version 4: The U.S. should deport documented Mexican immigrants back to
Mexico.
Version 5: The U.S. should deport documented Mexican immigrants who have
committed crimes in the U.S. back to Mexico.
Version 6: The U.S. should deport documented Mexican immigrants who have
committed violent crimes in the U.S. back to Mexico.

Figure 8 shows the distribution of responses to the question of interest. For clarity
in the images, I combined the answers for strongly disagree and disagree and strongly
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agree and agree. Overall, the majority of respondents agreed with every prompt, except
version four which discussed deporting documented immigrants to Mexico.
Unsurprisingly, respondents were much more likely to support deporting immigrants who
had committed a crime and even more so those who had committed a violent crime.
Additionally, respondents were substantially more likely to agree with the prompt
regarding deporting undocumented immigrants, compared to documented immigrants.
The descriptive results suggest that the public supports harsher responses to
undocumented immigrants committing the same crime as documented immigrants.

Figure 9. Deportations to Mexico Results, by Version
It is interesting to note that nearly 30% of Americans support deporting
documented immigrants who have not committed any crime. Potentially, some
respondents did not understand or glossed over the phrase “documented,” while others
might be so anti-immigrant, they wanted most immigrants deported from the U.S. To
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further explore this, I calculated a t-test between the response to version four, by support
for legal immigration11, and found a significant, positive response. Thus, while some
respondents likely misread or misinterpreted the phrase “documented immigration”, a
significant portion were against legal immigration in general.
To further analyze perceptions of deportations, I aggregate the data to compare
Americans’ perceptions of immigrants who have committed crimes, regardless of
documentation status, and Americans’ perceptions of undocumented vs. documented
immigrants, ignoring the prompt for crime type. Figure 10 depicts respondents’
perceptions of immigrants who have committed a crime or a violent crime, compared to
the baseline of no crime mentioned. Americans are about 15% more likely to agree with
the prompt when primed that the immigrant committed a crime and an additional 10%
more likely to agree with the prompt when told the immigrant committed a violent crime.
Figure 11 compares respondents’ perception of documented and undocumented
immigrants, with respondents approximately 16% more likely to support deporting
undocumented immigrants. These findings are consistent with expectations, which is that
Americans’ view undocumented immigrants and those who have committed crimes
negatively.

11

On the survey, I asked respondents whether they supported legal immigration and they could either select
yes or no.
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Figure 10. Deportations to Mexico Results, by Crime Type

Figure 11. Deportations to Mexico Results, by Immigration Status
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Finally, I ran a series of ordered logistic regressions with respondent’s answer to
the prompt as my dependent variable. I ran three models: the first tested the significance
of the experiment by adding dummy variables for respondents receiving versions 2-6 of
the experiment, the second included demographic controls, and the final model added a
series of attitudinal variables. For independent variables, I included a variable for age (9point cohort measure), a dummy variable for gender (female), a dummy variable for race
(White), a variable for education (7-point cohort measure), a variable for income (12point cohort measure), and a dummy variable for political ideology (Democrat).
Additionally, the survey included several attitudinal questions that I added as independent
variables. First, a dummy variable for those agreeing with the statement “I support free
trade between the U.S. and Mexico.” I used this question to help determine if respondents
desired a more open relationship between the United States and Mexico, which might
signify stronger support for more free movement of people. Second, a dummy variable
for those agreeing with the statement “I support continued tariffs on important Chinese
goods.” Though this question focuses on China, support for tariffs suggests a desire for a
more isolated U.S., focusing more U.S. specific interests, which could signify reducing
immigration inflows. Third, a dummy variable for those agreeing with the statement “I
support legal immigration,” which is included because support for legal immigration
likely suggests respondents desire less harsh responses to immigration inflows. Fourth, I
included a dummy variable for respondents answering no to the question “In your
opinion, is it easy for Mexicans to immigrate legally to the U.S.?”. I included this
variable because Americans who believe legal immigration is simple, likely are more
supportive of deportations for those who have “gamed” the system via illegal entry or
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committed a crime. Finally, I included the question “One a 1-10 scale, with 1 being very
negative and 10 very positive, how do you feel about the following countries [Mexico]?”.
I presume that Americans who view Mexico positively are likely more accepting of all
immigrants from the country. However, perceptions of Mexico may be shaped by views
on immigration and/or deportation, so the inclusion of this question could understate the
influence of the experimental design. Table 7 displays the regression results below.
Across all three models, versions 2-4 of the experimental design were
significantly different than the baseline. Thus, respondents appear more likely to support
deporting migrants who have committed a crime or violent crime, and less likely to
support deporting documented immigrants. The findings for my demographic variables
are unsurprising: older Americans and White Americans are more likely to support
deportations, while Democrats are less likely to support deportations. Regarding
attitudinal variables, those perceiving legal immigration as easy and those supporting
additional tariffs are more likely to support deportations, while those who view Mexico
positively were less likely to support deportations.
Table 7. June U.S. Survey Results
(1)
Model
0.424*
(0.247)

(2)
Model
0.491**
(0.248)

(3)
Model
0.507**
(0.251)

Version 3

0.729***
(0.255)

0.679***
(0.258)

0.723***
(0.262)

Version 4

-0.935***
(0.25)

-1.12***
(0.256)

-1.155***
(0.258)

Version 5

-0.085
(0.248)

-0.111
(0.25)

-0.11
(0.253)

Version 6

0.207
(0.248)

0.26
(0.249)

0.351
(0.253)

Version 2
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Age

0.159***
(0.045)

0.097**
(0.048)

Female

0.014
(0.167)

0.006
(0.17)

White

0.593***
(0.183)

0.659***
(0.186)

Education

-0.068
(0.057)

-0.036
(0.058)

Income

0.05*
(0.026)

0.062**
(0.027)

-0.473***
(0.152)

-0.242
(0.156)

Democrat
U.S.-Mexico Free Trade

-0.296
(0.186)

Tariffs on China

0.433**
(0.185)

Support for Legal Immigration

-0.287
(0.176)

Ease of Legal Immigration

0.55***
(0.155)

Mexico Sentiment
Observations
Pseudo R2
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

-0.129***
(0.034)
625
0.026

625
0.058

625
0.084

Next, I ran additional ordinal logistic regressions that condensed the versions into
dummy variables for immigrants who have committed crimes and violent crimes and a
dummy variable for documented immigrants. Otherwise, I used the same model
specifications. Table 8 includes dummy variables for the versions referencing crimes and
violent crimes and Table 9 includes a dummy variable for the versions identifying
documented immigrants. The additional models provided more support for my original
models, finding that Americans are sensitive to crime and documentation status. Though
versions five and six are insignificant in the first set of regressions, the conflicting factors
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of crime and documentation status canceled out, but the next two sets of regressions
provide additional evidence that crime and documentation status impact public opinion.
Additionally, the control variable results remained fairly consistent with the earlier
models.
Table 8. Deportations & Crime
(1)
Model
0.625***
(0.176)

(2)
Model
0.718***
(0.178)

(3)
Model
0.731***
(0.181)

0.903***
(0.18)

0.973***
(0.183)

1.055***
(0.186)

0.147***
(0.045)

0.084*
(0.048)

Female

-0.045
(0.165)

-0.06
(0.168)

White

0.586***
(0.181)

0.649***
(0.184)

Education

-0.058
(0.056)

-0.027
(0.058)

Income

0.041
(0.026)

0.051*
(0.026)

-0.426***
(0.151)

-0.198
(0.155)

Crime
Violent Crime
Age

Democrat
U.S.-Mexico Free Trade

-0.263
(0.184)

Tariffs on China

0.467**
(0.183)

Support for Legal Immigration

-0.324*
(0.175)

Ease of Legal Immigration

0.549***
(0.154)

Mexico Sentiment

-0.124***
(0.034)

Observations
Pseudo R2
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

625
0.014
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625
0.043

625
0.069

Table 9. Deportations & Immigration Status
(2)
Model
-0.667***
(0.147)

(3)
Model
-0.664***
(0.149)

0.163***
(0.045)

0.106**
(0.048)

Female

0.018
(0.166)

0.008
(0.168)

White

0.512***
(0.181)

0.578***
(0.184)

Education

-0.058
(0.057)

-0.028
(0.058)

Income

0.048*
(0.026)

0.059**
(0.026)

-0.406***
(0.15)

-0.191
(0.155)

Documented

(1)
Model
-0.627***
(0.145)

Age

Democrat
U.S.-Mexico Free Trade

-0.248
(0.185)

Tariffs on China

0.348*
(0.183)

Support for Legal Immigration

-0.268
(0.174)

Ease of Legal Immigration

0.561***
(0.153)

Mexico Sentiment

-0.119***
(0.034)

Observations
Pseudo R2
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

625
0.01

625
0.038

625
0.062

I ran several additional variations of the model, omitted for brevity. Specifically, I
included a dummy variable for living in a state bordering Mexico, a dummy variable for
having children, support for expansion in U.S. foreign affairs, believing oneself to be a
global citizen, believing one is likely to become unemployed soon, believing Biden
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improved ICE policies, and supporting increasing yearly U.S. refugee intake. However,
none of these inclusions changed the model’s core findings.
What do the results tell us? Americans are significantly more likely to support
deporting undocumented immigrants who have committed crimes, compared to those
who are documented and/or have not committed crimes. While many Americans are
concerned about undocumented immigrants (e.g., Suro, 2009; Gallup, 2021), there is
little public consensus on the ‘solution’ to undocumented immigrant inflows, with some
supporting deportations (Gallup, 2021), a path to citizenship (Gallup, 2021), or other
alternatives. I have found that a majority of Americans support deporting undocumented
immigrants and immigrants who have committed crimes. Though most Americans
recognize that immigrants are not disproportionately likely to commit crimes (Gallup,
2021), many media sources report and groups of Americans believe that undocumented
immigrants are heavily associated with criminal organizations (e.g., Barriere, 2019;
Rumbaut, 2008). And, when explicitly told immigrants have committed a crime,
particularly a violent crime, Americans support deportation as a “solution.” The public
appears to differentiate between immigrant deportations, suggesting pro-immigrant
platforms should work to remove the false association between undocumented
immigrants and crime from the media and public discourse.
Several of the other control variables, outside of the experiment itself, provided
insightful information about U.S. public opinion on deportations. Interestingly,
respondents who view legal immigration to the U.S. as easy are more likely to favor
deportations. Many of these Americans likely believe that immigrants should come to the
U.S. the “right” way, rather than “cheating” the system through entering the U.S.
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illegally. Deportations might be a logical punitive measure taken for those who they
believe deliberately immigrated illegally when they had a legal option. I also controlled
for respondent’s perceptions of legal immigration, but the results were null. A possible
explanation for this is that respondents who view legal immigration favorably diverge in
opinion on deportations because some support all immigration, while others believe
undocumented immigrants deserve to be deported for ‘cheating’ the system. Thus, ease of
immigration is likely a better indicator of support for deportations compared to general
support for legal immigration.
I also found that Americans who agree with tariffs are more supportive of
deportations. I used support for tariffs on China as a proxy for analyzing one’s desire for
America to isolate itself from the international community, suggesting an Americacentric view of global affairs. Additionally, trade with China is a uniquely controversial
issue, where many Americans take an “America First” stance similar to the issue of
undocumented immigration from Mexico. Similarly, support for Mexico was significant,
and Americans who viewed Mexico positively likely viewed Mexican immigrants as an
asset to the American community, rather than hindrance. The results for the demographic
variables were fairly consistent with past research, with older Americans and white
Americans more supportive of deportations, though the dummy variable for Democrat
was insignificant.
November U.S. Survey
While the dependent variable in the June U.S. survey focused on deportations
from Mexico, the November U.S. survey focused on deportations more broadly, based on
location. The goal of the experiment was to determine if the public differentiates between
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undocumented immigrants’ nationalities. As highlighted in the literature review, the
overwhelming majority of deportees are North American (DHS, 2019), suggesting the
public might conflate undocumented immigrants with undocumented Latin American
immigrants. The main variable of interest was the following experimental question that
respondents were randomly assigned a version of and asked to evaluate on a five-point
Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree:
Version 1: The U.S. should deport all undocumented immigrants.
Version 2: The U.S. should deport all undocumented Latin American immigrants.
Version 3: The U.S. should deport all undocumented African immigrants.
Version 4: The U.S. should deport all undocumented Asian immigrants.
Version 5: The U.S. should deport all undocumented European immigrants.
Version 6: The U.S. should deport all undocumented Middle Eastern immigrants.
In Figure 12, I combined respondents answering strongly disagree and disagree
and answering strongly agree and agree for simplicity. Overall, a plurality of respondents
(approximately 41 – 46%) either agreed or strongly agreed with each prompt. There was
relatively little variation between version, with statistical tests confirming that there is no
significant variation in responses between prompts.12 One potential explanation in social
desirability bias, where respondents believe it is socially undesirable to support deporting
immigrants from a specific location, particularly Latin America. For the remainder of my
analysis, I combine the responses to each prompt and ignore the experimental design
since there is no evidence suggesting the experiment alter respondent’s answers.

12

I confirmed this with through an ordered logistic regression.
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Figure 12. Deportations from Place of Origin
Interestingly, about 46% of respondents agree with deportations on this survey,
compared to 56% of respondents answering the baseline prompt in June 2021. The only
distinction between the November and June survey is that the June survey specifically
identifies deportees as Mexican. Historically, immigration from Mexico has been highly
politicized and reporting often focuses on the negative attributes of Mexican immigrants
(Neblo 2004; Voice of America News 2005; Wiegand 2009; Neblo et. al. 2012), so the
identification of respondents as from Mexico could explain the variation between
surveys. Even areas, such as Latin America, do not have the same negative political
resonance for many Americans.
To further analyze perceptions of deportations, I ran ordered logit regression
using support for deportations (ignoring the experiment) as the dependent variable. I ran
two models: the first including demographic variables and a second model adding
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attitudinal variables. As my independent variables, I included the same demographic
measurements (age, gender, race, education, income, and political affiliation) as in the
June U.S. survey. However, I added an additional dummy variable for Hispanic, Latin,
and/or Spanish respondents and a dummy variable for respondents born in the U.S. I also
included several attitudinal measures. First, “On a scale from 1-5, with 1 being not at all
concerned and 5 being very concerned, how concerned are you about undocumented
immigration?”13 This question helps assess if fear of undocumented immigrants taking
jobs, committing crimes, or taking some other harmful actions increase support for
deportations. Second, a dummy variable for those answering yes to “In your opinion, is it
easy for migrants to legally immigrate to the U.S.?” with the same justification as the
June survey. Third, I included a dummy variable for those answering yes to “Would you
support increasing foreign aid if this would lead to a decrease in undocumented
immigration into the U.S.?”. I included this question because it helps analyze what sort of
solution respondents desire for undocumented immigration, while helping to analyze
deportations themselves. Lastly, I included the statement “I am satisfied with how
democracy works in the U.S.,” which respondents answered using a five-point Likert
scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Respondents who believe that the U.S. has
a robust democracy might be more comfortable with the deportation process and less
wary of human rights abuses and they might also express concern that additional
undocumented immigrants disrupt the U.S.’s democracy.

13

I was concerned about multicollinearity between the dependent variable and level of concern over
undocumented immigration. However, a Pearson Correlation test suggests the level of correlation is
approximately 0.43.
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Table 10 shows the regression results below. Overall, women, Hispanic, Latin,
and/or Spanish individuals, and Democrats were, on average, less likely to support
deportations. Conversely, respondents with a negative perception of undocumented
immigrants, those who perceived legal immigration into the U.S. as easy, and
respondents with strong faith in U.S. democracy were more likely to support
deportations.
Table 10. Ordered Logit Regressions on Perceptions of Deportations
(1)
Model
0.054
(0.034)

(2)
Model
-0.04
(0.036)

Female

-0.282**
(0.118)

-0.244**
(0.123)

White

0.241*
(0.136)

0.217
(0.143)

Hispanic

-0.376**
(0.166)

-0.492***
(0.178)

Income

0.05***
(0.019)

0.018
(0.02)

Education

0.01
(0.043)

0.028
(0.044)

Democrat

-0.474***
(0.115)

-0.262**
(0.127)

0.059
(0.199)

-0.029
(0.207)

Age

Born in the U.S.
Undocumented Immigration Concern

0.59***
(0.05)

Ease of Legal Immigration

0.808***
(0.122)

Foreign Aid

-0.092
(0.12)

Faith in Democracy

0.136***
(0.05)

Observations

1043
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1000

Pseudo R2
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

0.02

0.094

What do the results tell us? While the experimental results are null, several of the
other independent variables correspond with support for deportations. Level of concern
over undocumented immigrants is associated with respondent’s likelihood of supporting
deportations. Of course, this makes sense: respondents who are anti-undocumented
immigrants are more likely to agree with deportations. This finding helps further the
debate over respondent’s preferred solution to undocumented immigration, which appears
to be deportations for many. Like the June 2021 U.S. survey, those believing legal
immigration is easy correlates with support for deporting undocumented immigrants,
likely for the reasoning explained earlier in this chapter. The measure for faith in
democracy helps develop this finding because those who believe the United States has a
robust democracy are more likely to believe it treats undocumented immigrants fairly and
provides a just legal immigration system. Additionally, those concerned undocumented
immigrants are “untrustworthy” might be concerned illicit integration into the U.S.
democracy could risk its solidity.
In terms of demographic variables, women are less likely to support deportations
and Hispanic, Latin, and/or Spanish respondents are less likely to agree with
deportations, possibly because of more personal connections to immigrant communities.
Another possible explanation is that Hispanic respondents are tired of xenophobic and
criminalizing media coverage directed at Latin American and Mexican immigrants in
particular (e.g., Barriere, 2019; Rumbaut, 2008), so they are less likely to support more
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extreme responses to undocumented immigration. Finally, Democrats are less likely to
support deportations, which is consistent with past literature (e.g., Cosby et al., 2013).
Comparative Analysis
Finally, I used the survey conducted in Mexico to compare the way Mexicans and
Americans responded to the question “In your opinion, is it easy for migrants to legally
immigrate to the U.S.?”. The question was asked almost identically on the June U.S.
survey, November U.S. survey, and June Mexico survey. However, in the June U.S. and
Mexico survey, I asked respondents whether they believed that legally immigrating to the
United States from Mexico is easy, while in the November U.S. survey, I asked if legally
immigrating to the United States is easy, without specifically mentioning Mexico.
While this question does not explicitly analyze public opinion on deportations, it
provides valuable insight on how people believe that the immigration system works. As
found with the two U.S. surveys, many American respondents who believe legal
immigration is easy are more likely to agree with deportations. This is one of the most
interesting explanatory variables in the earlier regressions and little empirical research
has been done on perceptions of ease of legal immigration, so it helps yield more
information about the characteristics of those who support deportations.
Figure 13 shows the responses on all three of the surveys. Unsurprisingly,
Mexicans were overwhelmingly more likely to believe that legally immigrating to the
United States from Mexico is difficult (about 78%), compared to Americans. Americans
were 4% more likely to believe immigrating to the U.S. generally is easy, compared to
from Mexico (49% vs 54%). One possible explanation for this that Americans assume
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there is an obvious legal path for immigrants, often based on stories about their ancestors
coming to the U.S. the “right” way.

Figure 13. Ease of Immigrating Legally to the U.S.

Finally, I run a series of logit regressions with assumed ease of legal deportation
as my dependent variables. I run three models, one for each survey I conducted. For the
June U.S. survey, my independent variables were age, gender, race, education, income,
political affiliation, perceptions of immigration, and perceptions of Mexico. 14 For the
November U.S. survey, my independent variables were age, gender, race, income,
education, political affiliation, perception of undocumented immigrants, and a dummy
variable for increasing foreign aid if it reduces undocumented immigration to the United

14

Each question was explained in further detail earlier in the paper when explaining independent variables
for the experimental deportation question on the June survey.
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States.15 For the Mexico survey, my independent variables were age (continuous
measure), gender (a dummy variable for female), race (a dummy variable for White),
education (10-point scale), income (6-point scale), political affiliation (a dummy variable
for members of the PAN and Morena), a dummy variable for knowing someone deported
from the U.S., a dummy variable for traveling outside of Mexico, and a measurement of
perceptions of the U.S. (10-point scale, 1 being most negative). Table 11 shows the
regression results for the three surveys.
Table 11. Ease of Legal Immigration to the US

Age

(1)
June
0.055
(0.053)

(2)
November
0.083**
(0.041)

(3)
Mexico
-0.176**
(0.070)

Female

-0.246
(0.189)

0.030
(0.144)

-0.301
(0.211)

White

-0.126
(0.214)

0.080
(0.162)

0.398*
(0.216)

Education

-0.100
(0.065)

-0.042
(0.051)

-0.052
(0.082)

Income

-0.033
(0.145)

-0.029
(0.022)

-0.090
(0.094)

Democrat

-0.591***
(0.173)

-0.487***
(0.146)

Mexico Sentiment

-0.104***
(0.035)

Support for Legal Immigration

-0.313*
(0.179)

0.342***
(0.052)

Foreign Aid

0.265*
(0.139)

Faith in U.S. Democracy

-0.005
(0.055)

Born in the U.S.

0.694***
(0.242)

15

Each question was explained in further detail earlier in the paper when explaining independent variables
for the experimental deportation question on the November survey.
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PAN

-0.044
(0.277)

MORENA

-0.331
(0.238)

Traveled Abroad

0.448*
(0.243)

Know a Deportee

-0.382*
(0.210)

U.S. Sentiment

0.149***
(0.051)

Observations
Pseudo R2
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

625
0.052

1007
0.070

598
0.052

Unsurprisingly, there were stark differences between respondents on the U.S.
surveys and the survey conducted in Mexico. Particularly, there was strong differences in
partisan perceptions of ease of legal immigration, with Democrats significantly less likely
to perceive legal immigration as easy and the party dummy variables null on the Mexico
survey. Thus, while Mexicans in general believe that immigration to the U.S. is difficult,
Americans are more likely to base their opinion on their political affiliation, suggesting
the American public needs better information on the immigration process.
The regression results help inform our understanding of public perceptions of
deportations in several ways. First, believing legal immigration to the United States is
easy corresponds with several immigration-related variables, suggesting it is a powerful
indicator of support for deportations. Second, the regression and descriptive results from
the Mexico survey are dramatically different from the U.S. survey results, indicating that
American perceptions of immigration is quite different from countries like Mexico where
there is a larger percentage of emigration. This tells us that American perceptions of
deportations might correspond with other countries that experience moderate to large
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amount of immigration but is possibly distinct from countries with more emigration.
Finally, few Americans have direct experience with immigrants or deported migrants,
suggesting that proximal or direct contact with immigrant communities could reduce
American’s desire for punitive responses to undocumented immigration, consistent with
contact theory (Tu and Lee, 2014; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008; King et al., 2009).
Content Analysis
In the second section of this chapter, I conduct content and sentiment analysis of
open-ended questions asked on the June and November surveys. Each respondent was
given unlimited space to write whatever came to mind about the prompt they were given.
To ensure accurate results, I removed respondents who had clearly written a string of
letters or words rather than a substantive response. I also fixed easily identifiable spelling
errors so that I could analyze the specific words used by each respondent.
For my actual content and sentiment analysis, I used the Syuzhet package in R,
which has three options for sentiment analysis: the Syuzhet, Bing, and Afinn packages.
The entire package was developed by researchers at Stanford University to associate
specific words with certain emotions allowing researchers to determine the sentiment
patterns in the text (Mhatre, 2020). Syuzhet, Bing, and Afinn each have a similar overall
goal of determining how positive, neutral, or negative the language used by respondents
was. The Syuzhet lexicon comprises 10,748 words, which are labeled as positive or
negative based on linguistics research and are matched with words in the response text to
determine if they have a positive or negative sentiment (Naldo, 2019). For example, the
world “evil” would be given a very low score because it is an extremely negative phrase.
The Bing package is composed of 6,789 words, including 2,006 positive words, and does
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not code for neutral words (Naldi, 2019). Similarly, the Afinn package includes slang
words and comprises 2,477 words, including 878 positive words, and the scale is broader
than the Syuzhet and Bing packages. (Naldi, 2019). Fortunately, the type of sentiment
analysis I am conducting avoids the most common problem researchers encounter with
the Syuzhet, Bing, and Afinn packages, which is that the packages do not pick up on
negative modifiers (Naldi, 2019) (i.e., the package would categorize the phrase
“immigrants are not scary” as negative, because it focuses on the world “scary” and
ignores the modifier “not”), but most respondents just answered with a single word and I
did not find any modifiers used in respondent’s answers.
June U.S. Survey
In the June U.S. survey, I asked the open-ended question: “Please name the first
word or phrase that comes to mind when thinking of the following countries [Mexico]”.
Using this question, I wanted to assess the number of respondents who immediately
thought of immigration-related issues, particularly the border, undocumented immigrants,
and deportations, when prompted to think about Mexico. Interestingly, out of 603
respondents, 114 (nearly 20%) wrote something about immigration or the U.S.-Mexico
border. Table 11 shows a word frequency of the five most common words among overall
respondents and respondents whose answers related to immigration. Immigration was the
most common word respondents provided, with 57 mentions, and border was the fifth
most common word, with 29 mentions. Respondents appear to think about immigration
or related topics quite often when thinking about Mexico.
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Table 12. Word Frequency Perceptions of Mexico
All

Immigration
Word
Frequency
Word
Frequency
Immigration
57
Immigration
57
Taco
45
Border
29
Food
38
Illegal
24
Drugs
37
Stay
3
Border
29
Wall
3
Next, I evaluated the levels of positivity and negativity respondents used when
answering the prompt. Figure 14 shows a Kernel Density plot analyzing the sentiment
(from very negative to very positive) used by respondents when responding to the prompt
about Mexico with an immigration-related answer, and Figure 15 shows a Kernel Density
plot analyzing all responses. The results suggest that respondents mostly relied on neutral
evaluations, skewing moderately negative. Table 12 reports the summary statistics the
Syuzhet, Bing, and Afinn for the immigrant-specific and general analysis. Overall, most
respondents appear to provide fairly neutral, descriptive responses. However, those
writing about immigration specifically tended to skew more negatively, suggesting many
of those who choose to write about immigration could have strong opinions about the
issue. Thus, I wanted to determine if the individuals who responded to the open-ended
question about immigration had different opinions regarding deportations. I attempted to
do this via logit regression where I coded respondents who answered the prompt with an
immigration-related response as 1 and all other respondents as 0, but I found limited
results. Even when including demographic and attitudinal variables, I found no
significant relationship between the dependent variable and any independent variable
tested.
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Figure 14. Immigration Kernel Density of Sentiment Towards Mexico

Figure 15. Non-Immigration Kernel Density of Sentiment Towards Mexico
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Table 13. Summary Statistics for Sentiment Analysis (immigration)
Minimum

First Quartile

Median

Mean

Third Quartile

Max

-0.14
-0.16
-0.34

0
0
0

0.25
0
0

0.01
-0.06
-0.1

0
0
0

1.25
2
6

Immigrant-Specific
Syuzhet
Bing
Afinn

-1
-2
-3

0
0
0

Syuzhet
Bing
Afinn

-2.6
-2
-6

0
0
0

0
0
0

General
0
0
0

Thus, I found that most respondents tended to provide neutral descriptors of
Mexico, rather than emotionally charged responses. However, those who wrote about
immigration specifically were more likely to provide negative responses regarding
Mexico and immigration. The results find support for immigration as a salient U.S.Mexico issue, which is especially evidenced by 1/5th of respondents writing about
immigration. What this tells us is that when many Americans are prompted to think about
Mexico, their initial thought is often negative and about immigration.
Surprisingly, the regression results suggest initial thought about immigration does
not correspond with specific opinions about deportations. I wanted to analyze this further,
so I looked at the break down between respondents who wrote about immigration and
compared it to their perceptions of deportations. Figure 16 shows the results, and I found
that respondents who wrote about immigration were more likely to have a strong opinion
on deportations, whether it was agreeing or disagreeing. Respondents who wrote about
immigration were almost 3% more likely to disagree with deportations and 6% more
likely agree. Therefore, respondents who were prompted to think about deportations most
likely had thought about immigration from Mexico in the past and developed a strong
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opinion. Though the regression results were null, the response to the open-ended question
likely does provide insight into one’s perception of deportations, but it pushes one
towards a strong opinion on either side, rather than just one direction. Perhaps a better
measurement would be whether one’s response was positive or negative, but the sample
size of only 114 makes it difficult to find robust results when categorizing the data by
sentiment. Additionally, determining the correspondence between sentiment and/or
writing about immigration with support for deportations is difficult in this instance
because the experiment design meant each version of the question was asked respondents
about slightly different issues.

Figure 16. Thoughts on Mexico and Perceptions of Deportations

November U.S. Survey
In the November U.S. survey, I asked the open-ended question: “What is the first
word or phrase that comes to mind when you think about deportations from the United
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States?” This question allowed me to home in on specific opinions of deportations, rather
than much broader opinions determined by the open-ended question on the June survey.
Table 14 shows the 20 most frequent words and their count from the open-ended
questions.
Table 14. Word Frequency Perceptions of Deportations
Word
Illegal(s)
Good
Sad
Mexican
None
Necessary
Nothing
Immigration
Unfair
Great

Frequency
62
57
48
30
29
21
20
32
16
15

Word
Yes
Cruel
Wrong
Enough
Bad
Justice
Freedom
Legal
ICE
Back

Frequency
14
13
13
13
12
12
11
11
11
10

While many people provided descriptive responses, such as “immigration” or
“illegal,” quite a few answered with an opinion-based response, such as “good” or
“cruel.” Of the 20 most frequent word choices, “good,” “necessary,” and “great” suggest
positive perceptions of deportations, while “sad,” “unfair,” “cruel,” “wrong,” and “bad”
are clearly negative. However, some responses likely suggest a certain opinion (i.e.,
illegals), but I cannot definitively determine their opinion of deportations. Some
responses, such as “Mexican” suggest that people attribute deportees to certain
characteristics, particularly based on their nationality. Figure 17 shows a word cloud of
the 200 most common words respondents used to describe deportations.
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Figure 17. Word Cloud on Perceptions of Deportations
Next, I analyze how positive or negative respondent’s evaluations of deportations
were. Figure 18 shows the Kernel Density of one’s emotional connotation towards
deportations. Syuzhet, Bing, and Afinn find similar results regarding the positivity or
negativity of responses, which is confirmed by statistical tests 16. Most people had a
neutral or slightly negative response to deportations, typically meaning that they
supported deportations or viewed undocumented immigrants negatively. Table 15 shows
the summary statistics for the emotional response to deportations for each type of
sentiment analysis conducted. After analyzing individual’s responses, the Afinn package
appears to best interpret the answers because its dictionary includes slang words used by
many respondents.

16

I ran Pearson Correlation tests and found that all three sentiment analysis packages were highly
correlated.
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Figure 18. Kernel Density of Deportation Sentiment

Table 15. Summary Statistics for Sentiment Analysis
Syuzhet
Bing
Afinn

Minimum
-2.5
-3
-10

First Quartile
-0.5
-1
-2

Median
0
0
0

Mean
-0.11
-0.13
-0.32

Third Quartile
0
0
0

Max
2.4
2
7

Next, I determined the types of emotions respondents used when answering the
prompt. The Syuzhet package goes beyond just positive and negative labeling, but also
determines if words in a text use language denoting anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy,
sadness, surprise, and/or trust (e.g. Mhatre, 2020; Kelbel 2021). Table 16 displays the
results of the sentiment analysis based on specific emotions. The most common
emotional responses were trust, joy, and fear. Quite a few respondents appeared to trust
the U.S. immigration system or were joyful when describing immigrants being deported.
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Alternatively, many respondents expressed fear or anger when describing the U.S.
immigration system, possibly in line with partisan differences. The emotional responses
calculated least often were disgust, surprise, and sadness, suggesting that respondents
skewed in favor of deportations. Interestingly, there were 1,008 respondents who
answered the open-ended questions and only 366 responses coded to one of the 8
emotions, meaning only approximately 1/3rd of responses fit into these emotional
categories.
Table 16. Emotional Responses to Deportations
Sentiment

Percent

Count

Disgust

10.38%

38

Surprise

10.93%

40

Sadness

11.20%

41

Anticipation

11.75%

43

Anger

12.02%

44

Fear

12.30%

45

Joy

14.21%

52

Trust

17.21%

63

Total

366

Finally, I ran a series of ordered logistic regressions to further interpret the openended responses. For my dependent variable, I used the scale calculated by the Afinn
sentiment analysis package. Since the scale used negative numbers as low as -6, I added 7
points to every observation, so that every number would be coded above zero. 17 For my
independent variables, I included the standard demographic variables age, gender, race,
ethnicity, income, education, political affiliation, and whether one was born in the United

17

I removed two extreme outliers. The respondents each wrote a very long paragraph, which is more
difficult for sentiment packages to analyze, compared to words or short phrases.
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States. Additionally, I included attitudinal variables measuring favorability of
deportations18, perceptions of ease of immigration, and faith in U.S. democracy.
Table 17 shows the regression results. The regression analysis finds that older
Americans, those with higher incomes, respondents supporting deportations, those
believing legal immigration is simple, and respondents with strong faith in U.S.
democracy had more positive perceptions of deportations. Most likely, many of the
respondents who provide positive evaluations of deportations are supporting deportations
or advocating for additional deportations.
Table 17. Ordered Logit Regressions on Afinn Sentiment Analysis
(1)
Model
0.13***
(0.035)

(2)
Model
0.08**
(0.036)

Female

0.041
(0.12)

0.05
(0.121)

White

0.247*
(0.138)

0.183
(0.14)

Hispanic

0.141
(0.165)

0.096
(0.168)

Income

0.081***
(0.019)

0.062***
(0.019)

Education

0.014
(0.043)

-0.023
(0.044)

Democrat

-0.06
(0.118)

-0.112
(0.125)

0.838***
(0.196)

0.505**
(0.20)

Age

Born in the U.S.
Support for Deportations

0.281***
(0.045)

Ease of Legal Immigration

0.31**
(0.121)

18

I was concerned about support for deportations perfectly explaining the variation in the dependent
variable. However, statistical tests confirm that there is insufficient evidence to assume multicollinearity.
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Faith in U.S. Democracy

0.196***
(0.042)

Observations
Pseudo R2
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

1074
0.023

1067
0.048

What does this the analysis from this question tell us? Most of the nuance in
individual responses cannot be captured by questions answered on a Likert scale, which
makes this open-ended question particularly useful. Many respondents used strong
language to describe deportations, relying on phrases such as “sad,” “cruel,” “justice,” or
“freedom,” and describing issues such as family-separation or even advocating for
violence against immigrants. This means that deportations are a very salient issue for
many Americans, with responses highlighting extreme polarization in opinions. Overall,
perceptions of deportations skewed slightly negative, which is consistent with the results
from the survey question on support for deportations. The regression results are fairly
consistent with the earlier results from the November U.S. survey. Americans who have
positive opinions on deportations are, naturally, more likely to support deportations as a
solution to undocumented immigration.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

This thesis contributes to the deportation literature by analyzing the factors that
influence deportations and public perceptions of deportations. Chapter 3 focuses on a
time series analysis of deportations, analyzing the various political, economic, and social
factors that correspond with changes in the deportation rate. Specifically, I found that
additional Republican Senators and Representatives in Congress correlates with higher
deportation rates. I also found that the unemployment rate immediately corresponds with
additional deportations, but after a few years has a null or even negative relationship with
deportations. Finally, I found that the incarceration rate, after a few years, correlates with
additional deportations, but after several years corresponds with reduces deportations,
suggesting a complex relationship with deportations. My findings replicate and extend
the findings of King et al. (2012) by including slightly different variables and a VAR
model which asses the duration of relationships between variables. However, there are
some limitations to my findings, including data availability and accuracy. U.S.
government agencies report different deportation statistics (i.e., DHS, 2019; Remsen,
2022) and it is unclear how accurately early deportation data is reported. Similarly, the
incarceration rate and unemployment rate are reported differently by different
organizations and agencies. Additionally, the results likely are subject to omitted variable
bias, given the difficulty in proxying economic and social conditions, particularly
reactions to crime. Future work could expand research on deportations by analyzing
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different methods of measuring the relevant data and determining how it impacts the
results.
Chapter 4 analyzes public perceptions of deportations. The first section of the
chapter finds that respondents are more supportive of deportations when is undocumented
and/or has committed a crime, particularly a violent crime. I also found that there is no
significant variation in support for deportations when a provided an immigrant’s
nationality. However, respondents were substantially more supportive of deportations in
the first experiment when told migrants were from Mexico, compared to the second
experiment when they were told migrants were from other locations, suggesting Mexico
is uniquely politicized. I also found that several demographic and attitudinal variables
corresponded with additional support for deportations, notably including a belief that
immigrating to the United States is easy. I compared perceptions of the ease of
immigration between two U.S. surveys and a survey in Mexico, finding that Americans
were substantially more likely to believe that immigration to the U.S. is easy. In the
second section of Chapter 4, I evaluated respondent’s answers to open-ended prompts
using novel sentiment analysis. When asked to write their initial thoughts about Mexico,
nearly 20% of respondents described deportations, relying mostly on neutral to
moderately negative descriptions. I also evaluated respondent’s answers to a prompt
asking them to provide their initial perceptions of deportations, finding that Americans
mostly provided neutral evaluations and used the emotional languages of trust and joy.
Regression analysis further found that positive evaluations of deportations corresponded
with older Americans, higher income Americans, being born in the United States, and
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faith in U.S. democracy. Chapter 4 helped understand American perceptions of
deportations and the variables that influenced those perceptions.
Admittedly, Chapter 4 has several limitations. First, the chapter focuses on
perceptions of deportations, but does not provide alternative responses to immigration.
Past public opinion research has found that many respondents might prefer a different
“solution,” such as a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants or imprisonment
for immigrants who have committed crimes (e.g., Gallup, 2021; Cosby et al., 2013).
Thus, future work could provide respondents with a list of increasingly punitive
responses to immigration, to determine if the public still desires deportations, even if
given other options. Additionally, many Americans may have little understanding of the
U.S. immigration system, how deportations work, or even of immigration-specific terms
(i.e., undocumented vs. documented immigration). Future work could provide more
information on the immigration system to yield more accurate results.
Deportations are an understudied component of the immigration system.
Relatively little research has analyzed influences of deportations and public evaluations
of deportations. This thesis seeks to fill the research gap regarding deportations, by
conducting time-series analysis of deportations and analyzing three original public
opinion surveys. The United States is one of the few countries in the world that still
heavily relies on deportations as a response to immigration, particularly undocumented
immigration. Studying the influences of deportations and public opinion is essential to
furthering policymaker’s discussion and understanding of deportations.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Variable
Δ ln (Deportations)
Δ ln (House Party Ratio)
Δ ln (Senate Party Ratio)
Republican President
Δ ln (Unemployment Rate)
Δ ln (Incarceration Rate)

N
127
127
127
127
127
127

Mean
-0.34
49.58
-22.92
0.53
4.04
0.22

Std. Dev.
2.85
553.4
308
0.50
31.16
0.31

Min
-7.51
-159.44
-3422.12
0.00
-81.33
-0.79

Max
9.21
6219.16
466
1.00
204.01
1.00

Std. Dev.
1.41
1.92
0.50
0.42
1.58
3.54
0.49
0.47
0.48
0.50
0.50
2.52

Min
1.00
8.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

Max
5.00
15.00
1.00
1.00
7.00
12.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
10.00

Appendix B
Variable
Deportations Experiment
Age
Female
White
Education
Income
Democrat
U.S.-Mexico Free Trade
Tariffs on China
Support Legal Immigration
Ease of Legal Immigration
Mexico Sentiment

N
625
625
625
625
625
625
625
625
625
625
625
625

Mean
3.53
10.72
0.49
0.77
3.68
5.76
0.43
0.34
0.35
0.50
0.49
6.16

Appendix C
Variable
Deportations Experiment
Age
Female
White
Hispanic
Income
Education
Democrat
Born in the U.S.
Undocumented Immigration Concern
Ease of Legal Immigration
Foreign Aid
Faith in U.S. Democracy

N
1043
1074
1074
1050
1050
1050
1050
1050
1050
1050
1050
1007
1050

Mean
3.24
10.49
0.50
0.73
0.15
5.73
3.50
0.43
0.91
3.50
0.54
0.57
6.94
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Std. Dev.
1.36
1.88
0.50
0.44
0.35
3.43
1.51
0.50
0.29
1.34
0.50
0.50
1.28

Min
1.00
7.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
5.00

Max
5.00
15.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
12.00
7.00
1.00
1.00
5.00
1.00
1.00
9.00

Appendix D
Variable
Ease of Legal Immigration
Age
Female
White
PAN
MORENA
Knows a Deportee
Traveled Abroad
U.S. Sentiment

N
625
625
625
598
625
625
625
625
625

Mean
0.22
3.36
0.51
0.32
0.22
0.45
0.52
0.60
7.71
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Std. Dev.
0.42
1.53
0.50
0.47
0.42
0.50
0.50
0.49
2.36

Min
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

Max
1.00
7.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
10.00

